

# ONLINE LEARNING / ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKING

Set of actions  $X$  (eg.  $X = \{1, \dots, k\}$ ,  $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ )

For  $t = 1 : T$

Adversary picks loss  $l_t \in \mathcal{F} : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  unknown

DM picks  $x_t \in X$

DM observes something about  $l_t$

Goal:  $\sum_{t=1}^T l_t(x_t) \rightarrow \min!$

What does DM observe?

Full information setting:  $l_t$

Bandit setting:  $l_t(x_t)$

Performance metric

$$\text{Regret } R_T = \sum_{t=1}^T l_t(x_t) - \min_{x \in X} \sum_{t=1}^T l_t(x)$$

want  $R_T / T \rightarrow 0$

"average excess loss compared to best fixed action in hindsight vanishes"

Ex  $X =$  set of experts  
"modifiers"

$h_1, \dots, h_k$

At each round, receive data point, and predictions  $y_t(1) \dots y_t(k)$  for the  $k$  experts  
 $y_t(x) \in \{0, 1\}$

We predict  $y_t$ , then observe  $y_t^*$

$$l_t(x) = \begin{cases} y_t & \text{if } y_t(x) = y_t^* \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

"full information" setting

## FULL INFORMATION

Warmup: Assume  $X = \{1 \dots k\}$   
 $l_t(x) \in \{0, 1\} \quad \forall x, t$   
 $\exists x: l_t(x) = 0 \quad \forall t$

Halving alg. maintain weights per expert

$$w_t(x) = 1 \quad \forall x \in X$$

At time  $t$ : let

$$\forall y \in \Sigma_{t+1}: w_t(y) := \sum_{x: y_t(x)=y} w_t(x)$$

total weight of all experts voting for  $y$

Predict weighted majority

$$\hat{y}_t := \operatorname{argmax}_{y \in \Sigma_{t+1}} w_t(y)$$

Pick some  $x_t$  who predicted  $\hat{y}_t$

Receive  $y_t^*$

$$\forall x: \text{set } w_{t+1}(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \hat{y}_t \neq y_t^* \\ w_t(x) & \end{cases}$$

Claim:  $R_T \leq \lceil \log_2 k \rceil$

Proof: Each round either: no mistake ( $l_t(x_t) = 0$ )

$$\text{or } \sum_{x=1}^k w_{t+1}(x) \leq \frac{1}{2} \sum_{x=1}^k w_t(x)$$

□

More generally

What if no expert is always correct?

What if  $l_t(x) \in [0, 1]$  ?

Multiplicative weights / Hedge:

init  $w_1(x) = 1 \quad \forall x$

for  $t = 1 : T$

$$P_t(x) = \frac{w_t(x)}{\sum_{x'} w_t(x')}$$

pick  $x_t \sim P_t$

incur loss  $l_t(x_t)$

$$w_{t+1}(x) = w_t(x) \cdot \exp(-\epsilon l_t(x)) \quad \forall x$$

If  $l_t \in [0, 1]$   
for "incorrect"  
experts, reduce  
weight  
 $\exp(-\epsilon)$   
 $\approx (1-\epsilon)$

Theorem  $E[R_T] \leq \frac{\log k}{\epsilon} + \epsilon \sum_{t=1}^T P_t^T l_t^2$

$$\sum_{x=1}^k P_t(x) l_t(x)^2$$

$\leq \epsilon \cdot T$  if  $l_t(x) \in [0, 1]$

for  $\epsilon := \frac{\sqrt{\log k}}{\sqrt{T}}$

Assuming  
 $l_t \in [0, 1]$

$$\Rightarrow E[R_T] \leq 2\sqrt{T \log k}$$

$$\Rightarrow \frac{E[R_T]}{T} \leq \frac{2\sqrt{\log k}}{\sqrt{T}}$$

Proof  $\Phi_t = \sum_{x=1}^k w_t(x)$ . Then  $\phi_1 = k$

$$\Phi_{t+1} = \sum_{x=1}^k w_t(x) \cdot \exp(-\varepsilon l_t(x))$$

$$= \Phi_t \sum_{x=1}^k p_t(x) \exp(-\varepsilon l_t(x))$$

$$\leq \Phi_t \sum_x p_t(x) (1 - \varepsilon l_t(x) + \varepsilon^2 l_t^2(x))$$

$$= \Phi_t (1 - \varepsilon p_t^T l_t + \varepsilon^2 p_t^T l_t^2)$$

$$\leq \Phi_t \exp(-\varepsilon p_t^T l_t + \varepsilon^2 p_t^T l_t^2)$$

$$\leq \underbrace{\Phi_1}_k \exp(-\varepsilon \sum_{t=1}^T p_t^T l_t + \varepsilon^2 \sum_{t=1}^T p_t^T l_t^2)$$

Note:  $p_t(x) = \frac{w_t(x)}{\Phi_t}$

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$$e^{-x} \leq 1 - x + x^2$$

for  $x \geq 0$

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$$e^x \geq 1 + x \quad \forall x$$

For best expert  $x^*$ ,  $w_T(x^*) = \exp(-\varepsilon \sum_{t=1}^T l_t(x^*))$

Thus:  $w_T(x^*) \leq \Phi_T \leq k \cdot \exp(-\varepsilon \sum_{t=1}^T p_t^T l_t + \varepsilon^2 \sum_{t=1}^T p_t^T l_t^2)$

$\Rightarrow$   $-\varepsilon \sum_{t=1}^T l_t(x^*) \leq \log k - \varepsilon \sum_{t=1}^T p_t^T l_t + \varepsilon^2 \sum_{t=1}^T p_t^T l_t^2$

$$\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}[R_T] = \sum_{t=1}^T p_t^T l_t - \sum_{t=1}^T l_t(x^*) \leq \frac{\log k}{\varepsilon} + \varepsilon \sum_{t=1}^T p_t^T l_t^2$$

□

## BANDIT SETTING

DM only observes  $l_t(x_t)$

→ exploration - exploitation

Key idea: Reduction to full information

Setting by constructing estimates of  $l_t(x)$

Ex. Recommender systems

$X$  = set of  $k$  possible recommend

At time  $t$ , user arrives

pick  $x_t$ , if user interested in  $x_t$ , user watches / clicks / -

$$l_t(x_t) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if user interested} \\ 1 & \text{otw.} \end{cases}$$

Sps we play  $x_t \sim p_t$  (as in Hedge)

$$\text{Define } \tilde{l}_t(x) := \begin{cases} \frac{1}{p_t(x_t)} l_t(x_t) & \text{if } x = x_t \\ 0 & \text{otw.} \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Then } \forall x: \mathbb{E}_{x_t \sim p_t} [\tilde{l}_t(x)] &= \sum_{x'} p_t(x') \cdot \tilde{l}_t(x') = p_t(x_t) \cdot \tilde{l}_t(x_t) + 0 \\ &= \cancel{p_t(x_t)} \cdot \frac{l_t(x_t)}{\cancel{p_t(x_t)}} = l_t(x_t) \end{aligned}$$

$$\forall x: \mathbb{E}_{x_t \sim p_t} [\tilde{l}_t^2(x)] = p_t(x_t) \cdot \tilde{l}_t^2(x_t) = p_t(x_t) \frac{l_t^2(x_t)}{p_t^2(x_t)} = \frac{l_t^2(x_t)}{p_t(x_t)}$$

Algorithm: EXP3 : Play Hedge on  $\tilde{l}_t$

Theorem: For  $l_t \in [0,1] \forall t, k$ : Sps we run EXP3 w.  $\epsilon = \sqrt{\frac{\log k}{T}}$

Then it holds:  $\mathbb{E}[R_T] \leq 2 \sqrt{T} \log k$  ← due to partial inf.

Proof:

$$\mathbb{E}[R_T] = \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=1}^T l_t(x_t) - \sum_{t=1}^T l_t(x^*)\right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=1}^T p_t^\top l_t - \sum_{t=1}^T l_t(x^*)\right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=1}^T p_t^\top \tilde{l}_t - \sum_{t=1}^T \tilde{l}_t(x^*)\right]$$

lin. of expect.  
 $x^*$  independent of  
 $l_{1:T}$  :  $\mathbb{E}[\tilde{l}_t] = l_t$

Hedge on

$$\leq \mathbb{E}\left[\varepsilon \cdot \sum_{t=1}^T p_t^\top \tilde{l}_t^2 + \frac{\log k}{\varepsilon}\right]$$

Note:  $\mathbb{E}[p_t^\top \tilde{l}_t^2] = \sum_{x=1}^k p_t(x) \cdot \mathbb{E}[\tilde{l}_t^2(x)]$   
 $= \sum_{x=1}^k \cancel{p_t(x)} \frac{l_t^2(x)}{\cancel{p_t(x)}} = \sum_{x=1}^k p_t(x) l_t^2(x) \leq k$

$$\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}[R_T] \leq \varepsilon \cdot k \cdot T + \frac{\log k}{\varepsilon}$$

Def. of  $\varepsilon$

$$\leq 2 \sqrt{T \cdot k \cdot \log k}$$

## LEARNING IN REPEATED GAMES

For  $t = 1:T$

We pick  $x_t \in X$

OPP. picks  $y_t \in Y$

We obtain  $l_t^x(x_t) = f(x_t, y_t)$

OPP. obtains  $l_t^y(y_t) = 1 - f(x_t, y_t)$

fixed

Can directly apply Hedge (or EXP3) with sublinear regret  $O(\sqrt{T \log k})$  (or  $O(\sqrt{T k \log k})$ )

Fact if both players play no-regret, the "average actions"  $P_T^x = \text{Unif}\{x_1 \dots x_T\}$   
 $P_T^y = \text{Unif}\{y_1 \dots y_T\}$

Converge to a Nash equilibrium in game  $f$

## OUTLOOK

Exponential gap (in  $k$ ) between full info and bandit setting.

In hindsight, often can also observe  $y_t$  (other player's action)

Can show:

$$\mathbb{E}[R_T] = O(\sqrt{T \log k} + \gamma_T \sqrt{T})$$

$\uparrow$   
regret under  
full info

$\uparrow$   
depends on  
structure of game

E.g.  $f(x, y) = w^T \phi(x, y)$ , for  $w \in \mathbb{R}^d$

$$\Rightarrow \gamma_T = d \cdot \log T$$

